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DOES CURRENT ANTITRUST REGULATION
PROVIDE FREE PARKING FOR EBAY AND
PAYPAL IN THE MONOPOLY GAME OF ONLINE
AUCTION SITES AND PERSON-TO-PERSON
ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEMS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Online shopping will never be the same again. "The economics and
technology of web-based businesses has resulted in the emergence of
companies that have substantial shares in their categories" in many
countries globally.' With a market share of the online auction market
exceeding ninety percent in several prominent European countries, eBay is
a prime example of this global phenomenon.2 Millions of individuals have
turned to online auctions as a venue for buying and selling virtually all
types of products including collectibles, electronics, and even
automobiles. 3 Many of these people have turned to eBay to earn a living
and support their households.4
EBay has dominated the online auction market since its initial public
offering 5 in 1998.6 Its growth rates have been staggering. 7  However,
1. David S. Evans, Antitrust Issues Raised by the Emerging Global Internet Economy, 102
NW. U. L. REv. 1987, 1999 (2008).
2. See id. at 1988, 2001 ("[E]Bay has more than a 90 percent share of auction site page
views in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK").
3. Emily Maltby, Has eBay Hit its Twilight?, CNN MONEY, Oct. 17, 2008,
http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/17/smallbusiness/ebay-jwilight.smb/index.htm.
4. Daniel Gross, My eBay Job, NEWSWEEK, May 22, 2008,
http://www.newsweek.com/id/138221.
5. Dawn Kawamato & Corey Grice, EBay Roars into Public Trading, CNET NEWS, Sept.
24, 1998, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10036948-38.html (noting eBay's share price
tripled upon its first day of public trading).
6. Meet Meg Whitman - Meg Whitman for Governor of California, MegWhitman.com,
http.//www.megwhitman.com/experience_-detail.php?id=30 (noting that under her leadership as
eBay's Chief Financial Officer from 1998-2000, Meg Whitman "turned eBay into an unparalleled
business success story").
7. See Brad Stone, EBay Profit Is Up 50%; Listings Off, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2007 (noting
a fifty percent increase in eBay's net income between 2006 and 2007).
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eBay's increase in profits was largely achieved through a combination of
strategic purchases of direct competitors in the online auction 8 and
payment systems markets, 9 as well as from steady annual increases in fees
that it charges sellers. EBay employs a variety of tactics to extract fees
from online auction sellers. " Sellers are charged both insertion fees (fees
for listing items) and final value fees (fees when the auction closes), both
of which are drawn from a tier structure based on the price of the item. 12
Additionally, eBay charges online auction sellers fees for accepting credit
card payments from buyers through its person-to-person (P2P) online
payment system, PayPal, Inc. (PayPal). 13 For most sellers, accepting
electronic payments, such as PayPal, is required. 14
Until recently, eBay sellers were permitted to accept a.wide array of
payment options from buyers including wire transfers, money orders, and
checks,' 5 as well as credit card payments through PayPal and other
merchant accounts. 16 However, pursuant to eBay's paperless payment
policy enacted on November 11, 2008, sellers may no longer accept
personal checks, cashier's checks, money orders, or wire transfers except in
limited circumstances. 17 In April 2008, eBay attempted to take its
8. See generally, e.g., Press Release, eBay, eBay to Acquire Majority Stake in Korea's
Internet Auction Co. (Jan. 8, 2001) http://investor.ebay.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=30278.
9. See generally Chris Gaither, eBay to Acquire PayPal for $1.5B, BOSTON GLOBE, July 9,
2002, at D1 (explaining eBay's deal to acquire PayPal, a profitable net payment company).
10. See Bob Sullivan, eBay's Clever Fee Increase Plan, MSNBC, Mar. 7, 2006,
http://redtape.msnbc.com/2006/03/ebays-cleverfe.html.
11. See generally eBay.com, Fees for selling on eBay,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
12. See id.
13. See eBay.com, About PayPal Fees, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/paypalfees.html (last
visited Sep. 18, 2009).
14. EBay.com, Selecting Payment Methods You Will Accept,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/pay/accepted-payment-methods.html ("For most listing categories,
you need to offer at least one electronic payment or Internet merchant credit card option.") (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008).
15. ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE 228-229 (2002).
16. Merchant accounts are provided by online banking services allowing individual sellers
to accept various types of credit cards as payments. See eBay.com, Selecting Payment Methods
You Will Accept, supra note 14.
17. Announcement, eBay, Safe Payment Requirements-Paperless Payments launch on
eBay.com (Nov. 11, 2008) http://www2.ebay.com/aw/my/200811111344042.html. EBay does
not allow sellers to offer to accept money order payments. However, eBay allows sellers to
accept a limited number of money orders when specifically asked or demanded by a customer if
they will accept them. See eBay.com, Discussion Boards, How are No Money Orders/Checks
Going to Bring in More Buyers?,
http://workshops.ebay.com/thread.jspa?threadlD=13000045&start--40 (last visited June 10, 2009)
(highlighting an eBay representative's posting of an unwritten policy whereby eBay sellers can
accept money orders on limited occasions).
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paperless payment policy even further by imposing a PayPal exclusivity
requirement on its Australia division. 18 This policy would have required
all eBay sellers in Australia to accept PayPal as their exclusive means of
accepting payments from customers. 9 After an unfavorable ruling by the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and 700 seller
complaints, eBay dropped its PayPal exclusivity requirement.20
Turbulent reactions to eBay's acceptable payment method restrictions
and mandatory PayPal requirements are not confined to Australia. A class
action consolidated lawsuit 21 was filed against eBay and is currently in the
discovery stage.22 The complaint alleges that "eBay is a monopolist in the
online auction market and has abused, and continues to abuse, its market
dominance to maintain and increase its monopolist profits."23  Further, it
alleges that eBay abused its market dominance by engaging in a series of
anticompetitive acts including "forcing auction sellers to accept PayPal as a
necessary means to successfully sell items on eBay, prohibiting sellers
from using online payment systems that may pose a serious competitive
threat to eBay," and "acquiring strategic competitors to protect against
threats to eBay's monopoly of the online action market and person-to-
person online payment systems."24 EBay is a company that traditionally
considered the buyer and seller community before pursuing corporate
interests, and consistently made concessions to its needs when necessary.25
However, the demands for increased shareholder profits and annual growth
have encouraged eBay's executives to unfairly maintain the company's
market power by engaging in anticompetitive business practices.26 These
practices have substantially damaged the sellers' ability to earn a living,
18. See Fran Foo, RBA to Review PayPal, eBay Link, AUSTRALIAN IT, Sept. 9, 2008,
http://www.australianit.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24314829-15306,00.html.
19. See id. ("Around five months ago, eBay submitted an 'exclusive dealing' notification to
the ACCC so it could make PayPal mandatory on all sales listings from May 21, then bar all other
payment methods from June 17.").
20. Id.
21. See Complaint, In re eBay Seller Antitrust Litig., 2007 WL 1908730 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4,
2007) (No. C-07-01882-JF (RS)) [hereinafter eBay Complaint].
22. See id.
23. See id. at .
24. See id. at 1-2.
25. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 205-06 (noting that when sellers were initially charged a
fee of $1.00 for listing a specific type of "reserve" auction, the community was outraged and
eBay responded by dramatically lowering the fee to $0.50). A reserve auction allows a seller to
set a minimum price that the auction listing must meet in order for the seller to be obligated to
sell the item for the final bidding price. See eBay.com, What's a reserve price?,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/questions/reserve-price.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
26. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 1-2.
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damaged the buyers' ability to shop at alternative online auction sites, and
damaged competition as a whole in the online auction and P2P
marketplace.
Part I of this comment introduces the main issues posed by eBay's
position as a monopolist and its attempt to maintain monopoly power in the
market of online auction sites and P2P payment systems. Part II will
discuss a brief background and history leading to the development of
current antitrust law and the relevant antitrust violations alleged against
various monopolies similar to eBay. Part III will discuss online auction
sites as identifiable and distinct marketplaces from other forms of online
shopping. Part IV will argue that eBay possesses monopolistic power in
the online auction marketplace due to both its control of a predominant
market share and the existence of trade barriers. Part V will examine how
eBay has attempted to willfully maintain its monopoly power by acquiring
competitors and also by eliminating other competitors through exclusionary
agreements. Part VI will discuss how those policies can potentially result
in antitrust injuries to buyers and sellers of online auctions within eBay.
Part VII will propose fair alternatives to eBay and PayPal's policies of
trade restraint, emphasizing injunctive relief aimed at curbing eBay's
anticompetitive business practices. Finally, Part VIII will conclude that
even in an economic recession, eBay should not be given a free pass to
engage in antitrust violations that harm competition.
II. ORIGINS OF ANTITRUST LAW: THE SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS
The purpose of antitrust law is to prevent "injury to the public by the
prevention of an undue restraint on, or the monopolization of, trade or
commerce." ' 7 Congress, under its constitutional power of the Commerce
Clause to regulate interstate commerce, passed the Sherman Antitrust Act
(Sherman Act) in 1890.28 Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal." 29 Additionally, section 2 of the Sherman
act (Section 2) declares that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
27. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
29. Id.
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felony." 30 This legislation was passed because of opposition in the late
nineteenth century to trusts, 31 which consolidated to form monopolies and
charged excessive prices for financial gain to the detriment of consumers. 
32
The Sherman Act reflected the belief that markets are not self-correcting
and that the government can "intervene affirmatively in ways that would
improve market outcomes."33 An early example of this philosophy is the
Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States.34
A. Antitrust Law Before Microsoft: Standard Oil and the Rule of Reason
In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court found Standard Oil guilty of
monopolizing the petroleum industry through a series of abusive and
anticompetitive actions. 35  Despite Standard Oil's growth, which was
originally driven by superior refining technology and consistency in its
kerosene products, its tactics were ultimately deemed anticompetitive. 
36
These tactics included underpricing its products and threatening suppliers
and distributors who conducted business with Standard Oil's competitors.
The Court's remedy was to divide Standard Oil into several competing
firms. 38 In reaching its decision, the Court adopted the "Rule of Reason"
holding that only combinations and contracts unreasonably restraining
trade are subject to actions under the antitrust laws and that size and
30. Id.
31. USNews, The Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890),
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/documents/docpages/documentpage51.htm (last visited Nov.
18, 2008) ("A trust was an arrangement by which stockholders in several companies transferred
their shares to a single set of trustees."); see also TheFreeDictionary, Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Sherman+Anti-Trust+Act (last visited Oct. 20,
2008) (noting that by 1888, the corporate holding companies "had consolidated a very large share
of U.S. manufacturing and mining industries into nationwide monopolies").
32. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890), supra note 31.
33. See William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 37 (1991).
34. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
35. See id. at 72 ("[Dlefendants [Standard Oil] ... have monopolized, and are continuing to
monopolize, a substantial part of the commerce among the states, in the territories, and with
foreign nations, in violation of section 2 of the anti-trust act.").
36. Alex Epstein, Vindicating Capitalism: The Real History of Standard Oil Company, 3
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 2 (2008), available at
http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2008-summer/standard-oil-company.asp.
37. See generally Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 76 (noting Standard Oil's "intent to drive others
from the field and to exclude them from their right to trade").
38. See id. at 78 (noting the Court's resolution to dissolve Standard Oil into several
competing firms).
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possession of monopoly power are not illegal. While certain
arrangements such as price fixing and market division, as found in
Standard Oil, are considered unreasonable per se, most other restraints are
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 4
The dissent in Standard Oil argued that the majority's decision to
adopt the "Rule of Reason" was a departure from the Court's initial
application of the Sherman Act. 4 1  Justice Harlan believed the Court's
earlier decisions seemed to embody the notion that all contracts restraining
trade were prohibited, regardless of whether the restraint actually produced
ill effects.42 The Clayton Antitrust Act (Clayton Act),43 passed by
Congress in 1914, extended the right to sue under the antitrust laws to "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 44 The Clayton and Sherman Acts
are also enforceable by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ).45
The Sherman Act was "consciously designed to develop through
judicial interpretation. 46  Consequently, the Justices' perceptions of
monopolistic business practices, derived from the surrounding culture and
changes in business and technology, have reflected their views.47 More
recently, with the dominance of large technology firms, the case of United
States v. Microsoft Corp. has helped shape the modem manifestation of
current antitrust law.
39. See id. at 66 ("If the criterion by which it is to be determined in all cases whether every
contract, combination, etc., is a restraint of trade within the intendment of the law, is the direct or
indirect effect of the acts involved, then of course the rule of reason becomes the guide.").
40. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982).
41. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 100.
42. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating the Court's decision "has not only upset the long-settled interpretation of the act, but has
usurped the constitutional functions of the legislative branch of the Government"); see also
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341-42 (1897) (noting that a mere
restriction on the autonomy of traders would suffice to establish that an agreement restrained
trade within the meaning of the Act).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006). The Clayton Act increased the reach of antitrust law
enforcement to include exclusive dealing, tying, and merger and acquisition agreements.
44. Id. § 15(a) (2006).
45. See U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust Div., Overview,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/overview.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2010) (noting the division's joint
enforcement and promulgation of antitrust laws and policies, respectively, with the FTC).
46. Page, supra note 33, at 39.
47. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE, 289 n.7 (1990)
("[A] pragmatist judge will feel free to adopt the socially preferable interpretation of a statute
when the choice is open.").
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B. Using Market Power in One Market to Influence Competition in a
Different Market
1. Microsoft Corp.: The Development of Modem Antitrust Law in the
Digital Age
In 1998, a coalition of nineteen states and the DOJ sued Microsoft
over alleged abuses of monopoly power under Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act in its handling of operating system and browser sales. 48 First,
it was alleged that Microsoft had a monopoly in the market for personal
computer (PC) operating systems and had used anticompetitive and
predatory tactics to maintain its monopoly power.49 Such anticompetitive
conduct included Microsoft's alleged attempt to gain a monopoly in the
Internet browser market by forcing computer companies using its Windows
operating system to agree to leave Internet Explorer (EE) as the default
browser and to not preinstall or promote the browser of any other
company. 50 In addition, the complaint stated that Microsoft had forced
computer companies that used Windows to sign agreements stating that
they would not license, distribute, or promote software products that
competed with Microsoft's own software products. 51 Finally, the DOJ
accused Microsoft of "tying" its own browser to its own operating system
so that customers who purchased Windows also had to purchase IE, even
though the two were separate products. 52
This product-tying violation was alleged to have been a prominent
factor in Microsoft's conquests in the browser wars 53 because all Windows
48. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that
the U.S., nineteen individual states, and the District of Columbia brought "these consolidated
civil enforcement actions against defendant Microsoft Corporation ... under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2"); see also Complaint, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No.
1:98CV01232 (D.D.C. filed May 18, 1998).
49. See Complaint at 1, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 1:98CV01232 (D.D.C. filed
May 18, 1998) (noting Microsoft's monopoly with a market share of 90%).
50. See generally id. at 5-6 (describing Microsoft's attempts to exclude competition).
51. See id. at 2 (describing Microsoft's attempts to exclude competitors by using
"exclusionary agreements precluding companies from distributing, promoting, buying, or using
products of Microsoft's software competitors or potential competitors").
52. Id. at 2 ("Microsoft's conduct included agreements tying other Microsoft software
products to Microsoft's Windows operating system ... ").
53. The term "browser wars" refers to the competition for dominance in the web browser
marketplace. It denotes two specific periods of time: the competition between market-
dominating Netscape Navigator and its eventual defeat by Microsoft Internet Explorer during the
late 1990s, and the competition between the dominating Internet Explorer and several emerging
browsers that has gone on since 2003, most notably including Mozilla Firefox, Safari, Opera and,
in late 2008, Google Chrome. See generally Brad Stone, Open-Source Upstart Challenges the
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users thereby owned IE by default.54 Consequently, Microsoft was
accused of "substantially foreclos[ing] [the market for] competing Internet
browsers" such as Netscape Navigator and Opera because this tying
violation "reduced demand for other browsers" which had to be purchased
separately in a store or downloaded over the Internet.55 In response,
Microsoft argued that the merging of Windows and IE was the result of
innovation and competition and that the two had become one product. 56
Microsoft argued that the integrated product benefited consumers who
would consequently receive 1E free of charge.57 However, in 2000, the
District of Columbia District Court disagreed and found Microsoft guilty of
the violations and ordered Microsoft to be split in two. 58 Nevertheless, on
appeal, Microsoft successfully argued that splitting the company would
diminish efficiency and slow the pace of software development.59
Additionally, the trial court reversed Microsoft's tying violation on
remand. Shortly after the Microsoft decision, a similar antitrust lawsuit
was filed against credit card companies Visa U.S.A. (Visa) and MasterCard
International, Inc. (MasterCard). 61 As in Microsoft, the case involved a
Big Web Browsers, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008, at Cl.
54. United States v. Microsoft, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UnitedStates-v._Microsoft
(last visited Oct. 14, 2009) (describing the consolidated set of civil actions filed against Microsoft
Corp).
55. See generally Complaint at 39-40, Microsoft Corp., No. 1:98CV01232 (D.D.C. filed
May 18, 1998) ("Tying Internet Explorer to Windows 95 also reduced demand for other
browsers, even by users and OEMs that would otherwise have preferred another browser.").
56. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 48-49 (D.D.C. 2000)
("Microsoft contends that Windows and Internet Explorer represent a single 'integrated product,'
that offers 'some advantage' to consumers.").
57. See Franklin M. Fisher, Antitrust and Innovative Industries, 68 ANTITRUST L. J. 559,
561 (2000).
58. See Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (noting that since Microsoft "ostensibly priced
Internet Explorer at zero does not detract from the conclusion that consumers were forced to pay,
one way or another, for the browser along with Windows"); see United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 59 (D.D.C. 2000) ("[C]onduct modification and structural
reorganization including mandated divestiture was appropriate remedy.").
59. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 98-99 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting the courts
divestiture must be vacated). The court also cited three additional reasons for vacating the order:
"(1) the court failed to hold a remedies-specific evidentiary hearing when there were disputed
facts; (2) the court failed to provide adequate reasons for its decreed remedies; and (3) this Court
has revised the scope of Microsoft's liability and it is impossible to determine to what extent that
should affect the remedies provisions." Id.
60. Id. at 84 (noting that an alleged tying violation must be remanded and decided under the
rule of reason of § 1 of the Sherman Act). See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992) (a tying violation occurs if the "arrangement violates § 1
of the Sherman Act [because] the seller has 'appreciable economic power' in the tying product
market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market").
61. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
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company's power in one market, namely general purpose card "network
services," which influenced competition in the corollary market of general
purpose cards. 62
2. UNITED STATES V. VISA U.S.A. INC.: CREDIT CARD ANTITRUST
LEGISLATION BEFORE THE RISE OF PAYPAL
In Visa, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's holding
that Visa and MasterCard violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by
enacting and enforcing exclusionary rules which prohibited their member
banks from issuing competing American Express (Amex) or Discover
cards. 63 It also upheld the order to revoke the exclusionary rules and
permanently enjoined them "from [enacting] similar rules in the future." 64
Visa and MasterCard are two of the four major network systems in the
payment card industry in the U.S. 65 "[They] are organized as open joint
ventures, owned by the numerous banking institutions that are members of
the networks."66 Both Visa and MasterCard allowed their member banks
to issue each other's credit cards but required that such member banks sign
agreements precluding them from issuing Amex or Discover cards. 67 The
rules mandated that any member bank that issued "Amex-branded cards
would be forced to give up issuing both Visa and MasterCard cards-a
move no U.S. bank ha[d] been willing to make."68 Consequently, Amex
and Discover were shut out of the business of bank-issued cards. 69
The Court of Appeals found that there were two distinct markets. 7o
First, the four credit card networks compete in a market for general purpose
card "network services" whereby the "four [credit card] networks
themselves are the sellers, and the issuers of cards [(banks)] and merchants
are the buyers."71 Second, there is a relevant market for general purpose
cards whereby the "issu[ing banks] are the sellers, and the cardholders are
the buyers."72  The Court found Visa and MasterCard liable under the
Sherman Act because their exclusionary rules adversely affected
62. See generally Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34; Visa, 344 F.3d at 238-39.
63. Visa, 344 F.3d at 234.
64. Id.
65. Id. (noting that Amex and Discover comprise the remaining two credit card networks).
66. Id. at 235.
67. Id. at 235-36.
68. Id. at 236.
69. Visa, 344 F.3d at 237.
70. Id. at 238-39.
71. Id. at 239.
72. Id.
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competition by "reducing overall card output and available card features as
well as by decreasing network services output and stunting price
competition. 7 3 Changes in technology, the development of a web-based
economy, as well as attitudes toward government intervention in business
since Visa and Microsoft have continued to raise antitrust concerns.74
C. Current Antitrust Law in the Wake of Online and Digital Platforms:
Regulation of Market Power in Web-Based Powers Themselves.
The Microsoft cases entailed the use of the company's market power
in operating systems and web browsers to manipulate competition in web-
based markets; however, the Google and eBay situations involve "market
power in web-based products and services." 
75
1. Google: The Case of Double Click and Google Checkout
Like Microsoft, Google, a dominant firm, has come under constant
antitrust scrutiny. 76 However, the differences between the companies'
antitrust issues are clear. The nature of the Web makes switching search
engines or advertising platforms simple compared to eliminating Windows
for a Macintosh or a Linux-based operating system.77  Additionally,
network effects resonate more strongly in the software world than in that of
the Web.78 Although the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decided not to
block Google's acquisition of DoubleClick after a lengthy investigation in
2007, it expressed its intent to "closely watch these markets" involved in
online advertising.
The FTC based its decision upon finding that Google's acquisition of
DoubleClick did not threaten "to eliminate direct and substantial
competition between the two companies." 80 The FTC's analysis of the
evidence showed that "the companies are not direct competitors in any
73. Id. at 240.
74. See generally Evans, supra note 1, at 1987.
75. See id. at 1988.
76. See generally Peter Whoriskey, Google-Yahoo Deal Raises Antitrust Fears, WASH.
POST, June 14, 2008, at DI (noting the Department of Justice's investigation into the proposed
merger between Yahoo and Google).
77. Declan McCullagh, In D.C. Antitrust Circles, How Google Became the Hunted, CNET
NEWS, Sept. 9, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578-3-10036948-38.html.
78. See generally discussion infra Part IV.C (network effects).
79. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Trade Commission Closes Google /
DoubleClick Investigation, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/googledc.shtm.
80. Id.
2009] EBA YAND PA YPAL "S AUCTION AND P2P PAYMENT MONOPOLIES 185
relevant antitrust market." 8 1 Furthermore, the FTC found that DoubleClick
did not possess a significant market share of the third-party ad servicing
market that could be exploited by Google to harm competition, thus
benefiting Google's ad intermediation product, AdSense. 
82
Despite potential threats of antitrust scrutiny, Google has continued
expanding into markets that transcend mere web searching and ad
revenue. 83 In 2006, "Google introduced its Google Checkout payment
service in competition with PayPal by extending its software platform...
and bundling Google Checkout for merchants into AdWords84 for
advertisers." 85  "It is a well-established economics proposition that a
monopoly [can] make greater profit if it also own[s] complementary
monopolies or if it [can] replace these complementary monopolies with
competitive markets." 86  The latter can happen "through mergers or
through one dominant firm challenging another, as Google is doing with
eBay" and PayPal in online payment services. 87
III. ONLINE AUCTION SITES ARE A SEPARATE MARKET PLACE OVER
WHICH EBAY HAS MONOPOLY POWER
The Federal Government has the power to regulate monopolies under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 88 The threshold element of a Section 2
monopolization offense is "the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market." 89 The Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as
the "power to control prices or exclude competition." 90 In assessing a
monopolization claim under Section 2, the Court must first ascertain the
boundaries of the commercial activity that can be termed the "relevant
81. Id.
82. Id. (noting the FTC's investigation of Doubleclick's potential market share dominion
and Google's ability to use its dominance in the search engine market to influence the third party
advertising market).
83. See generally Evans, supra note 1, at 1987.
84. "Adwords" is one of Google's pay-per-click advertising services where users "create ads
and choose keywords, which are words or phrases related to [their] business[es]." Google.com,
Welcome to AdWords, http://www.google.comladwords (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
85. Evans, supra note 1, at 2004.
86. Id. (citing Michael A. Salinger, Introduction to Chapters VII and IX of Augustin
Cournot, Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, 4 COMPETITION POL. INT'L 274, 280-
82 (2008)).
87. Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
89. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
90. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
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market." 91 Next, the Court must assess the defendant's actual power to
control prices in, or to exclude competition from, that market. 92 Under the
Sherman Act, a "relevant market" is generally defined as a pool of services
that are reasonably interchangeable and are therefore economic substitutes
for one another. 93
A. Online Auction Sites as a Separate "Relevant" Market Place
In Microsoft, the alleged relevant market was worldwide licensing of
Intel-compatible personal computer (PC) operating systems. 94 There, the
court concluded that the licensing of Intel-compatible PC operating systems
was a relevant market because there were "no products-and. . . there
[were] not likely to be any in the near future-that a significant percentage
of computer users worldwide could substitute for [those] operating systems
without incurring substantial costs." 
95
Here, online auction sites can be defined as an independent relevant
market because the ability of sellers to list items for sale, and for buyers to
bid on particular items of interest is unique. 96  Indeed, eBay has
acknowledged that there are virtually no substitutes for the online auction
market structure of its website. 97 In its first Form 10-K, filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 28, 2007, eBay
stated that "[a]t the core of [its] Marketplaces platform are [its] traditional
auction format listings, in which a seller will select a minimum price for
opening bids, with the option to set a reserve price for the item, which is
the minimum price at which the seller is willing to sell the item."
98
Additionally, eBay describes its auction services as a "distinctive forum"
with an "auction format [that] creates a sense of urgency among buyers to
91. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177
(1965) ("Without a definition of [the relevant] market there is no way to measure [defendant's]
ability to lessen or destroy competition.").
92. E.I du Pont de Nemours, 351 U.S. at 391 ("Monopoly power is the power to control
prices or exclude competition.").
93. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("Because the ability of consumers to turn to other suppliers restrains a firm from raising
prices above the competitive level, the definition of the 'relevant market' rests on a determination
of available substitutes.").
94. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
95. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000).
96. See generally eBay Complaint, supra note 21 ("EBay's unique service 'permits sellers
to list items for sale, buyers to bid on items of interest and all eBay users to browse through listed
items."').
97. See generally id.
98. See id.
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bid for goods and creates an entertaining and compelling trading
environment." 99
Compared to standard e-commerce websites and retail stores, online
auctions seem to create a near perfect marketplace for which no
comparable substitute exists. O While a traditional retail store model, e-
commerce website, or classified ad allows sellers to list an item at a given
price, an online auction allows a seller to set a minimum price and allows
bidders to hammer out a final price, whatever that may be. '01 This creates
various types of market efficiencies and advantages for sellers. First, it
typically allows for sellers to receive a fair market price by enabling
registered users from all over the world to bid on items. 102 Second, the
online auction format enables sellers to obtain substantial product turnover
without resorting to wholesale prices. 103 By listing identical items
consecutively or simultaneously with minimum starting bids, sellers can
ensure that they recuperate costs on each item while still turning a certain
amount of profit for every item that sells. This is so even if there is some
volatility among the final prices of those items. 104 Some advantages for
buyers include setting their own prices and the ability to purchase virtually
any type of product, such as rare and obscure collectibles, which may not
be available elsewhere. 105
IV. EBAY HAS MONOPOLY POWER IN THE ONLINE MARKET PLACE
A. Market Share and Barriers to Entry
Once a relevant market has been defined, monopoly power may be
presumed if an entity owns a predominate share of that market. 106
99. See id.
100. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 20-21 (describing the inspiration of eBay founder Pierre
Omidyar to develop a "perfect marketplace" that more closely mirrored the free market than
traditional methods of buying and selling goods online).
101. See id. at 20 ("Instead of posting a classified ad saying I have this object for sale, give
me a hundred dollars, you post it and say here's a minimum price." (quoting eBay founder Pierre
Omidyar)).
102. See id. at 169-170 (noting how an eBay seller sold a rare early Blown Glass Cathedral
Pickle bottle he believed might be worth $275.00 for a final auction price of $44,100).
103. See JOSEPH T. SINCLAIR, EBAY BUSINESS THE SMART WAY 3-20 (3d ed. 2007).
104. See id.
105. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 23 (listing some of the auctions posted in the early days
of eBay including an autographed pair of Marky Mark underwear, 1967 Superman metal lunch
box, and Collectors Multicolor Reflection Hologram with current bids of $400, $22, and $5,000
dollars, respectively).
106. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (stating that the
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Additionally, such power may be proven through evidence of specific
conduct undertaken by the defendant that indicates he has the power to
affect price or exclude competition. 107 Predominate market share has been
defined as low as seventy five percent. 108 However, past court decisions
have shown that looking to current market share alone can be "misleading"
because of the possibility of new entrants into the market that may obtain a
percentage of a predominate firm's market share. 109 Therefore, courts will
often look beyond present market share and examine structural entry
barriers 10 that may protect a company's future position.
In Microsoft, the court inferred that:
if a single firm or cartel controlled the licensing of all Intel-
compatible PC operating systems worldwide, it could set the
price of a license substantially above that which would be
charged in a competitive market-and leave the price there for a
significant period of time-without losing so many customers as
to make the action unprofitable. 12
Additionally, the government proved that Microsoft possessed a
"dominant, persistent, and increasing" 1 3 share of the market that currently
exceeded 95%. 114 Further, "[t]he plaintiffs also proved that the [Windows]
applications barrier to entry protect[ed] Microsoft's dominant market
share." 115 The court concluded that the combined "proof of dominant
"existence of [monopoly] power ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the
market").
107. KMB Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995).
108. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992)
(80% is predominant); Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (87% is predominant); United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 379, 391 (1956) (75% is predominant).
109. See Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir.
1986) ("Market shares reflects current sales, but today's sales do not always indicate power over
sales and price tomorrow."); Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 924
(9th Cir. 1980).
110. See Rebel Oil Co., v. AtI. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that entry barriers such as certain regulatory requirements are factors that prevent new
rivals from timely responding to an increase in price above the competitive level).
111. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that
the court focused its decision "not only on Microsoft's present market share [95%], but also on
the structural barriers that protect[ed] the company's future position").
112. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 36 (D.D.C. 2000).
113. Id.
114. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 54. The court also found that even if the Mac
Operating System were included, Microsoft's market share would still exceed 80%. Id.
115. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d at 36 ( "[T]his barrier ensures that no Intel-compatible
PC operating system other than Windows can attract significant consumer demand, and the
barrier would operate to the same effect even if Microsoft held its prices substantially above the
competitive level for a protracted period of time.").
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market share and the existence of a substantial barrier to effective entry
creat[ed] the presumption that Microsoft enjoy[ed] monopoly power." 116
B. EBay Has a Predominate Market Share in Online Auction Sites
As the world's largest online auction house, eBay controls
approximately 96% of the market for online auction sites in the United
States and 57% of the entire market share of online auctions worldwide. 117
EBay acknowledged this fact when it described itself in its first form 10-K
filed with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1999 as "the
world's largest and most popular person-to-person trading community on
the Internet, based on the number of items listed, number of users and
minutes of usage per month." 118 Like Microsoft, eBay's growth has been
"dominant, persistent, and increasing" over the last decade; eBay's 2006
10-K 119 indicates that "in the last three years alone, eBay's active users (all
those who bid on, bought, or listed an item) increased from 56.1 million in
2004... [to] 81.8 million in 2006. " 120 Additionally, "[i]ts gross
merchandise volume (the total value of all successfully closed items)
increased from $34.168 billion in 2004 ... to $52.474 billion in 2006." 121
Nevertheless, eBay continues to face steady competition from new online
auction site competitors, such as Swoopo, who attempt to break into the
market. 122 Despite these new entrants, many of these rivals specialize in
specific categories of wares such as electronics and therefore fail to garner
any significant percentage of market share. 123 Additionally, some of these
online auction sites sell only new products 124 or prohibit individual sellers
116. Id.
117. See Evans, supra note 1, at 2000-01, (citing cOMScoRE, MYMETRIX KEY MEASURES
REPORT (Dec. 2007); COMSCORE, MY-METRIX QSEARCH 2.0 KEY MEASURES REPORT (Dec.
2007)).
118. See eBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 4 (quoting eBay's March 29, 1999 10-K45).
119. Federal Securities laws require publicly traded companies to disclose annual
information on a 10K form. This form provides a comprehensive overview of the company's
business and financial condition and includes audited financial statements. See U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Form 10K, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml0-k.pdf (last
visited June 10, 2009).
120. See eBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 5.
121. See id.
122. Swoopo is a new online auction site that specializes in videogames, housewares, and
other miscellaneous electronics. Buyers place bids on products in standard online auction format.
With each bid placed, the price of the item increases by 12 cents. However, individuals cannot
sell their products on Swoopo and only brand new merchandise is sold there. See What Is
Swoopo?, http://www.swoopo.com/whatis.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2009).
123. See, e.g., id.
124. See, e.g., id.
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from participating. "25 Consequently, both buyers and sellers are drawn to
eBay as a one-stop shop for virtually any type of product available for sale
in online auction format.
C. High Barriers to Entry Persist in the Online Auction Sites Market
1. The Network Effect
One barrier to entry into the online auction market that has protected
eBay's monopoly is the network effect. 126 In markets characterized by
network effects, one product or standard tends towards dominance because
"the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases with
the number of other agents consuming the good." 127 Anyone who has ever
used a cellular phone has experienced the network effect. 128 "An
individual consumer's demand to use (and hence her benefit from) the
[cellular] network, for example, increases with the number of other users in
the network whom she can call or from whom she can receive calls." 129
However, as the benefits of one cell phone provider grow, such as
AT&T's 130 mobile to mobile calling, 131 the "costs to consumers of
choosing, or switching to, a rival offering" rise. 132 Microsoft provides a
recent example of this phenomenon, as the court acknowledged that
Windows was compatible with the widest range of hardware and software
due in part to the network effect. 133
125. See, e.g., id.
126. A network effect causes the value of a good or service to a potential customer to
directly depend in the number of customers who own the good or are users of the service. See,
e.g., Evans, supra note 1, at 1995; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and
Network Effects, 8 J. ECO. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994).
127. Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 Am. ECON. REV. 424,424 (1985).
128. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
129. See, e.g., id. at 8.
130. AT&T is a cellular phone and telephone network that provides coverage to over 79
million AT&T customers. See Mobile to Mobile Calling and Coverage, Wireless from AT&T,
http://www.wireless.att.com/learn/why/mobile-to-mobile/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
131. Mobile to mobile calling is a service offered to AT&T cellular customers that permits
them to enjoy unlimited calling to other AT&T cellular customers without exhausting any
daytime cell phone minutes. See id.
132. Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 128, at 5.
133. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that an
applications barrier to entry "stems from two characteristics of the software market: (1) most
consumers prefer operating systems for which a large number of applications have already been
written; and (2) most developers prefer to write for operating systems that already have a
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Hardware and software manufacturers ensure that their products are
compatible with Windows in order to have access to the large market of
Windows users. 134 Accordingly, "Windows is popular because it is well
supported, but it is well supported because it is popular." 135 Additionally,
"[b]ecause the applications barrier to entry protects a dominant operating
system irrespective of quality, Microsoft has the power to stave off even
superior new rivals." 136 Consequently, the court in Microsoft held that the
barrier was a characteristic of the operating system market, not of
Microsoft's popularity or quality. 137
This same network effect principle largely holds true for online
networks, such as eBay, and other multi-sided platforms, 138 like
Facebook. 139 Since "[a]n interactive technology has value only if many
people use it," 140 the network effect does not exist for many traditional e-
commerce businesses where one commercial vendor sells to many
others. 141 Conversely, eBay's dominance as an online auctioneer puts it in
what eBay's founders called a "virtuous cycle." 142 Buyers and sellers
gravitate towards eBay to sell their products because they know of its
popularity amongst other buyers and sellers, thus enabling eBay to quickly
achieve critical mass. 143
Once a network reaches "critical mass," 144 this barrier to entry makes
substantial consumer base." Therefore this "chicken-and-egg situation ensures that applications
will continue to be written for the already dominant Windows, which in turn ensures that
consumers will continue to prefer it over other operating systems.").
134. See Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 55.
135. See eBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 5.
136. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 56.
137. Id.
138. David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J.
ON REG. 325, 328 (2003); David S. Evans, Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform
Industries, 2 REv. NETWORK ECON. 191, 191 (2003) (explaining that multi-sided platforms
provide goods or services to two or more "distinct groups of customers who need each other in
some way" and who rely on the platform to intermediate transactions between them).
139. Facebook is an online interactive social networking site where users share biographical
data, connect with friends, and engage in networking. See Facebook, http://www.facebook.com
(last visited June 15, 2009).
140. COHEN, supra note 15, at 101.
141. See id at 100-01 (noting that the products and prices offered by traditional e-
commerce sites do not depend on who shops there).
142. Id. at 100.
143. Id.
144. "[C]ritical mass is the number of users [on a network] at which the quantity demanded
becomes positive." IVAN PNG & DALE LEHMAN, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 336 (3d ed. 2007)
(explaining that on networks such as eBay, positive demand will only be achieved when the price
or other factors are sufficient to attract a set number of users equivalent to the critical mass). This
explains why other auction sites or internet startups often fail, because they never attract enough
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it increasingly difficult to compete with a network like eBay. 145 Best
stated by eBay's founder Pierre Omidyar: "We had a big magnet, which
was eBay, and all these little magnets came along and tried to pull people
away... [b]ut eBay's magnet was so powerful it was hard for them to get
started." 146 Arguably, like the Windows platform, even if superior auction
sites are created, they will be unable to attract significant buyers and sellers
to their venue due to the established network effect in place.
2. EBay Users Exert Substantial Investments in Their Feedback Ratings
EBay's structure serves to further accelerate the network effect for its
market of online auctions. 147 Since buyers and sellers typically remain
anonymous to each other offline, both rely heavily on eBay feedback. 148
Buyers can leave positive, neutral, or negative feedback, while sellers can
only leave positive feedback. 149 Each positive feedback rating for a
successful sale or purchase has the same percentage effect on a user's total
feedback rating. "0 These feedback ratings can reflect anywhere from
weeks to years of online commerce. 151 Registered eBay users remain
significantly invested in eBay because if they were to switch auction sites,
this feedback-and subsequently buyer confidence-would vanish. 152 In
fact, studies have shown that sellers' feedback ratings have a measurable
effect on the price a buyer will pay for an item. 153 One study showed that
users to reach a critical mass. Id.; see also Ina Steiner, Yahoo! Europe to Close Auction Sites,
Signs Major Ad Deal with eBay, AUCTIONBYTES.COM, May 23, 2002,
http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y02/mO5/i23/s0 (noting Yahoo!'s closure of various
auction sites in Europe because "Yahoo! could not attract enough users to these sites to allow it to
charge auction listing fees").
145. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 100 (noting that when eBay achieved critical mass at an
early stage in its formation, it "made no sense for users to go to any other site... [because]
[b]uyers who did were less likely to find what they were looking for... [and] sellers were less
likely to get a good price").
146. Id. at 101.
147. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 6.
148. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 100 (noting that eBay users were reluctant to leave eBay
because they had significantly invested in their reputations based on such feedback ratings).
149. EBay.com, How Feedback Works,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/feedback/howitworks.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2008).
150. See id. (noting that members receive one point for each positive rating whether they are
a seller or a buyer).
151. COHEN, supra note 15, at 100.
152. See id. (noting that leaving eBay for a seller who had acquired significant feedback
"would be like a businessman closing up shop in a town where he was well known and starting
over somewhere new").
153. David Lucking-Reiley et al., Pennies from eBay: The Determinants of Price in Online
Auctions, 55 J. INDUS. ECON. 223, 232 (2007).
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an established seller with a strong 154 feedback rating earned an average
eight and one tenth percent more in final auction prices than sellers with
newly established feedback records. 155
Consequently, eBay sellers are very reluctant to turn to rival auction
sites because doing so would damage their reputation and trust, which in
turn reduces their ability to charge equivalent prices for their items as an
established seller. 156 Furthermore, they would have to compete with sellers
on the new auction site or other consumer-to-consumer 157 e-commerce
platforms such as Amazon.com's 158 fixed-price marketplace where other
sellers may already have an established feedback reputation. Additionally,
feedback on eBay encourages users to remain on its site because this
feedback carries over to Half.com, 159 eBay's wholly-owned subsidiary P2P
fixed-price website, a direct competitor to Amazon.com. 160 Moreover,
feedback ratings encourage buyers to remain on eBay because positive
feedback resulting from a successful purchase can ultimately strengthen an
account benefiting that user if he or she ever decides to sell items. 161
154. See Paul Resnick et al., The Value of Reputation On eBay: A Controlled Experiment, 9
EXPERIMENTAL EcON. 79, 87 (2006) (noting that a "strong" feedback rating for purposes of the
study was a net score of over 2000, with only one negative).
155. Id. at 99.
156. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 100 (describing sellers' reluctance to turn to rival sites
because doing so would damage their reputation and trust); Resnick et al., supra note 154, at 99
(concluding that established sellers with strong reputations receive price premiums and can
therefore charge more for their goods than new sellers).
157. Consumer-to-consumer transactions are a type of e-commerce where individual third
parties sell directly to one another. Therefore, the host website may simply act as a middleman or
intermediary service to conduct the transaction such as eBay's auction forum or Amazon.com's
marketplace. See STEFFANO KORPER & JAUNITA ELLIS, THE E-COMMERCE BOOK: BUILDING
THE E-EMPIRE 11 (2d ed. 2001).
158. Arnazon.com is an e-commerce website that sells a wide variety of goods directly to
consumers. However, unlike traditional e-commerce websites, it also allows sellers to offer their
goods at fixed prices alongside Amazon.com's offerings. Sellers and buyers can exchange
feedback and Amazon.com charges sellers various fees including a percentage of the item price
for all items that sell in the marketplace. See generally Amazon.com, Selling at Amazon.com,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeld=1161274 (last visited
Nov. 27, 2008).
159. See Aron Hsiao, Buying and Selling on Half com, ABOUT.COM,
http://ebay.about.conod/websiteareas/a/ow-half.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2009) (noting that
"Half.com transactions are also tracked in eBay feedback, so you gain feedback when you buy
and sell on Half.com"); see also Half.com, http://www.half.ebay.com (last visited Dec. 18, 2009)
(listing the exclusive categories as books, textbooks, music, movies, games, and game systems).
160. See Greg Sandoval, eBay Makes Move for Fixed-Price Future, CNET NEWS, Oct. 9,
2001, http://news.cnet.com/eBay-makes-move-for-fixed-price-future/2100-1017_3-274155.html
(noting that eBay's expansion into fixed-priced goods by purchasing Half.com could challenge
Internet retailers such as Amazon.com).
161. See How Feedback Works, supra note 149 (noting that both buyers and sellers can
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Therefore, because eBay controls a dominant market share and substantial
barriers to effective entry exist in online auctions, eBay enjoys monopoly
power and can potentially exclude competitors from this market. 162
Further, eBay is free to set its auction fee prices at higher levels than would
normally exist with normal market competition, without excluding enough
customers to make the action unprofitable.
V. EBAY ABUSES ITS MONOPOLY POSITION BY ENGAGING IN
ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT INSTEAD OF COMPETING ON THE MERITS
A. Antitrust Law Establishing Anticompetitive Conduct of Monopoly
Maintenance
"In a § 2 [antitrust] case, once it is proved that the defendant
possesses monopoly power in a relevant market, liability for
monopolization depends on a showing that the defendant used
anticompetitive methods to achieve or maintain its position." 163 The
defendant's "willful acquisition or maintenance of' power is to be
"distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident." 164 One example of an
anticompetitive method is exclusionary conduct.165 "Whether any
particular act of a monopolist is exclusionary, rather than merely a form of
vigorous competition, can be difficult to discern ... ." 166 Consequently,
the appellate court in Microsoft outlined a four-part test that courts
currently employ to determine "whether particular conduct can be said to
violate" Section 2. 167
"First... a monopolist's act must have an 'anticompetitive
effect.' 168 "That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby
harm consumers." 169 Second, in a private action, "the plaintiff. . . must
receive one point for each positive rating).
162. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 1.
163. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 37 (D.D.C. 2000); accord
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
164. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
165. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 156 (D.D.C. 2002) (quoting
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) ("[T]he appellate court set
out to determine whether Microsoft 'maintain[ed], or attempt[ed] to maintain, a monopoly by
engaging in exclusionary conduct."').
166. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58.
167. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d at 157.
168. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58.
169. Id.; see Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
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demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct indeed has the requisite
anticompetitive effect." 170 Furthermore, in an action brought by the
government, the plaintiff must "demonstrate that the monopolist's conduct
harmed competition, not just a competitor." 171 Third, "the monopolist may
proffer a 'procompetitive justification' for its conduct." 172 If the plaintiff
does not rebut the justification, the monopolist may escape liability. 1
Therefore, if applicable, the fourth prong of the inquiry requires that the
plaintiff "demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct
outweighs the procompetitive benefit." 174
B. Monopoly Maintenance in the Case of Microsoft
"[T]he District Court held that Microsoft had violated § 2 by
engaging in a variety of exclusionary acts.., to maintain its monopoly by
preventing the effective distribution and use of products that might threaten
that monopoly." 175 The acts included:
(1) the way in which it integrated IE into Windows; (2) its
various dealings with Original Equipment Manufacturers
("OEMs"), Internet Access Providers ("lAPs"), Internet Content
Providers ("ICPs"), Independent Software Vendors ("ISVs"),
and Apple Computer; (3) its efforts to contain and to subvert
Java technologies; and (4) its course of conduct as a whole. 176
Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive behavior in two ways: (1) it
prohibited OEMs from promoting rival Internet browsers 177 and (2) it
placed restrictions upon OEMs to pre-install the IE browser. 178 This was
of particular importance in determining browser usage share because it is
170. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 58-59; see generally Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225-26 (1993). In a case brought by a private
plaintiff, the plaintiff must show that its injury is "of 'the type that the statute was intended to
forestall."' Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977) (quoting
Wyandotte Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967)).
171. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 59.
172. Id. (stating that procompetitive justification is a "nonpretextual claim that its conduct is
indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or
enhanced consumer appeal").
173. Id.; see also Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d
537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993).
174. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 59.
175. Id. at 58.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 62.
178. Id. at 60.
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one of the most cost-effective ways to distribute a browser. 179 The District
Court found that by restricting OEMs from allowing the removal of IE
desktop icons, they could not, practically speaking, install a second rival
browser because it would lead to user confusion and increase an OEM's
technical support costs. 180 "Microsoft's efforts to gain market share in one
market (browsers) served to meet the threat to Microsoft's .monopoly in
another market (operating systems) by keeping rival browsers from gaining
the critical mass of users necessary to attract developer attention away from
Windows as the platform for software development." 181
Additionally, the District Court found that Microsoft's integration of
IE and Windows had an anticompetitive effect on the operating systems
market. 182 Microsoft removed the Add/Remove Programs utility of IE in
the Windows 98 version of Windows, which had the effect of "reduc[ing]
the usage share of rival browsers not by making Microsoft's own browser
more attractive to consumers but, rather, by discouraging OEMs from
distributing rival products." 183
C. EBay Acquires Rivals Who Could Jeopardize EBay's Dominance of
Online Auctions and as an Endeavor to Control the Market for P2P Online
Payments
In order for auctions to function, there needs to be a transfer of money
from the buyer to the seller in exchange for the auctioned goods. 184 In the
late 1990s, P2P payment systems developed and began "to fulfill this
component of online auctions." 185 A significant amount of overlap
continues to exist between the users on P2P online payment systems and
179. Id.
180. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 61 (noting that "pre-installing more than one product in a
given category... can significantly increase an OEM's support costs, for the redundancy can
lead to confusion among novice users"). Novice users, confused upon seeing two browser icons,
will call OEM support staffto ask which browser to use and when. See id.
181. Id. at 60.
182. See id. at 65 ("Because Microsoft's conduct, through something other than competition
on the merits, has the effect of significantly reducing usage of rivals' products and hence
protecting its own operating system monopoly, it is anticompetitive ... .
183. Id.
184. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, INTERNET AUCTIONS: A GUIDE FOR BUYERS AND
SELLERS 3, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/tech/tec07.pdf (last visited Nov. 22,
2008) (noting that "at the end of a successful auction, the buyer and seller communicate-usually
by email-to arrange for payment and delivery").
185. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 7; see COHEN, supra note 15, at 228 (noting that
PayPal was created in 1999 and allowed users to transfer money from computer to computer
using e-mail).
2009] EBA YAND PA YPAL 'S AUCTION AND P2P PAYMENT MONOPOLIES 197
online auctions. 186 Companies that provide a P2P payment system for a
large percentage of users on an auction site could more easily overcome
barriers to entry, such as network effects. 187 Therefore, "the growth of a
preferred payment system network [such as PayPal] created an early threat
to eBay's monopoly over the online auction market."' 188 After
acknowledging this threat to its online monopoly and "watching PayPal's
success with concern and frustration," eBay sought to neutralize the threat
through acquisition. 189
1. EBay Acquires Billpoint to Compete With PayPal
In April 1999, eBay bought the credit card processing firm,
Billpoint. 190 By mid-2001, PayPal had built a large user base in the P2P
marketplace and Billpoint had failed to gain any significant market
share. 191 Between 1999 and 2002, before "eBay acquired PayPal, eBay
engaged in various anticompetitive" acts in order to eliminate PayPal as a
threat to its online auction market. 192 These included: "funneling buyers
(with 'continue' buttons and other prompts) to Billpoint, thereby giving
buyers the impression that the eBay payment format, known as 'buy it
now' , accepted only Billpoint payments; declaring that sellers were
required either to have a credit card merchant account or to accept Billpoint
to be included in eBay stores, de facto excluding PayPal as a payment
option"; "banning PayPal from eBay's community boards" and "mandating
that buyers use a 'checkout' feature that presented marketing materials
promoting Billpoint and even took the buyer to a Billpoint payment
form." 194
186. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 7.
187. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 231 ("PayPal had the advantage of a larger installed-user
base, which made it the beneficiary of network effects.").
188. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 7; see also COHEN, supra note 15, at 229 (noting
that eBay tried "for over a year to develop its own online payment system").
189. COHEN, supra note 15, at 229-30; see Tim Clark, EBay Acquires Two Firms, CNET
NEWS, May 18, 1999, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-226031.html (noting eBay's acquisition of
Billpoint, a company which allows the transfer of person-to-person payments).
190. COHEN, supra note 15, at 230.
191. See id. at 231.
192. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 7-8.
193. Items listed with a "Buy It Now" feature allow bidders to purchase the item instantly
for a listed price, without bidding or waiting for the auction to end. This feature disappears after
a user has bid on the item that does not have a reserve, or after a reserve price has been met. See
eBay.com, Selling Using a Fixed Price, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fixed-price.html (last
visited June 15, 2009).
194. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 8; see also COHEN, supra note 15, at 231
("[Billpoint] was increasingly being integrated into the eBay site. When sellers listed an item on
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2. EBay Acquires PayPal to Eliminate it as an Economic Rival
In 2002, after eBay lost the battle to entrench Billpoint as a significant
contender to PayPal, eBay acquired its competitor, PayPal. 195 Due to the
acquisition of PayPal, eBay decided to shut down Billpoint. 196 Hence,
eBay's acquisition of PayPal eliminated a primary competitor for profits
derived from payments of online auctions. 197
Prior to the 2002 eBay acquisition, PayPal stated that "it handle[d]
payment[s] for one in four winning auctions on eBay." 198 Further, Chief
Executive Officer Meg Whitman, in justifying the PayPal acquisition,
stated that "about 40 percent of eBay transactions are settled with
electronic payments, a figure she hope[d] would 'increase
dramatically."' 199 When eBay acquired PayPal, analysts noted that this
was the joining of two leading forces in the online auction market and
online payment services. 200 As described by Merrill Lynch Analyst, Justin
Baldauf, "PayPal is the 'gorilla' in the online payment market, as eBay is
the 'gorilla' in the online auction market." 201 Hence, eBay employed its
monopoly power to acquire PayPal due to its inability to establish a
successful rival to PayPal through market incite, proficiency, or the
creation of a better or preferred service, in order to willfully maintain
power in the online auction and P2P online payment markets. 202
3. EBay's Acquisition of Verisign
In February 2005, eBay implemented a policy change which required
all sellers to accept payment cards 20 3 whenever using the PayPal system. 204
Shortly after announcing this change in policy, on or around November 21,
eBay, they were offered a one-click option to use Billpoint, but not PayPal to close the sale.").
195. Troy Wolverton, It's Official: eBay Weds PayPal, CNET NEWS, Oct. 3, 2002,
http://news.cnet.com/Its-official-eBay-weds-PayPal/2100-1017_3-960658.html; see Gaither,
supra note 9 (announcing eBay's acquisition of PayPal for $1.5 billion in eBay stock).
196. Id.
197. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 8.
198. Margaret Kane, eBay Picks Up PayPalfor $1.5 Billion, CNET NEWS, July 8, 2002,
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-941964.html.
199. Id.
200. Gaither, supra note 9 (stating that the deal brings together the world's largest Internet
auction house with the leading provider of online payments).
201. Kane, supra note 198.
202. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 8.
203. Payment card refers to transactions with credit, debit, or charge accounts, such as Visa
or MasterCard.
204. See eBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 10.
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2005, eBay acquired Verisign's payment gateway business "to combine
with its PayPal [P2P] online payment system." 205 "The acquisition of this
business segment of Verisign allowed eBay and PayPal the ability to
process credit card payments internally without relying on a bank or other
intermediary, while at the same time eliminating Verisign as a rival online
payment method for eBay sellers."20 6  Like Microsoft's efforts to gain
market share in the browser market to protect its operating system, eBay's
efforts to gain market share in the P2P services market similarly preserves
eBay's monopoly power in the online auction market. 207 By keeping rival
P2P services from gaining the critical mass necessary to attract the
attention of consumers, eBay thereby reduced the available alternative
accepted payment methods for developers of other online auction sites.2 o8
Consequently, this has allowed eBay to "charge supra-competitive fees to
,,209auction sellers enabled by anticompetitive activities.
D. EBay Implemented Anticompetitive Policies Through PayPal to
Maintain Its Monopoly of the Online Auction Market and the P2P Online
Payment Systems Market
After removing PayPal as a strategic threat, eBay succeeded in
making PayPal an absolute necessity for sellers in the online auction
market. 210 As touted by eBay, the vast majority of auctions are paid with
PayPal and 90% of eBay users have PayPal accounts.211  EBay's
anticompetitive policies with respect to PayPal include: (1) "requiring
sellers to accept PayPal or have a separate merchant account for Payment
Cards"; (2) prohibiting sellers from accepting checks, money orders, and
other previously accepted payment methods; (3) "discontinuing insurance
protection for non-PayPal transactions on eBay"; (4) "excluding competitor
[P2P] online payment systems from eBay's network"; and (5)
205. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 9; see also Greg Sandoval, eBay Buys Payment
Service from Verisign for $370 Million, USATODAY.CoM, Nov. 10, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2005- 10-10-ebay-verisign-x.htm
(announcing eBay's decision to purchase Verisign).
206. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 9.
207. See id. at 5.
208. Id. at 6.
209. Id. at 9 (noting that supra-competitive pricing is pricing above what can be sustained in
a competitive market).
210. Id. at 10.
211. Keith Regan, eBay Puffs Up PayPal With Fraud Protection Upgrade, E-
COMMERCETIMES, June 20, 2008, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/63507.htm (noting
that eBay stated 97 percent of eBay.com listings offer PayPal as a payment option and more than
90 percent of active eBay users have PayPal accounts).
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implementing PayPal exclusivity arrangements worldwide. 212
1. EBay's Current Rules Mandate That Sellers Either Take PayPal or
Maintain a Merchant Account
Pursuant to an eBay policy, all sellers who register after January 17,
2007 must agree to offer payment cards as a payment option.213 They do
so either by using eBay's PayPal service or an alternative credit card
214merchant account. To use PayPal, customers set up an account with
their credit card or bank account details, fill out a payment amount with the
e-mail address of the recipient, and send the payment via the Internet to
PayPal.215 PayPal allows users to engage in two types of payment
methods: (1) a stored-value payment where buyers make payments from
direct transfer through a connected bank account or via money already
existing in their PayPal account; or (2) payments via credit cards such as
Visa, MasterCard, Discover, or American Express. 216 EBay's policies
limit online payment services to those that are expressly permitted to be
used by auction buyers and sellers. 217 This effectively limits sellers who
do not have their own merchant account, enabling them to accept payment
cards using either PayPal, ProPay, or hyperWALLET.218
However, ProPay does not allow for stored-value payments; instead,
it only allows for payments via payment cards. 219 Consequently, PayPal
currently only provides one realistic alternative for most individual
212. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 10; see eBay.com, Safe Payment Requirements -
Paperless Payments Launch on eBay.com, http://www2.ebay.com/aw/my/200811111344042.htm
(last visited June. 10, 2009).
213. See eBay.com, Frequently Asked Questions: Rewards & Standards,
http://pages.ebay.com/sell/update08/rewardsfaq/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
214. Selecting Payment Methods You Will Accept, supra note 14.
215. See generally PayPal.com, How PayPal Works, https://www.paypal.com/us/cgi-
bin/webscr?cmd=xpt/Marketing/general/NewConsumerWorks-outside (last visited June 10,
2009).
216. See id.
217. See eBay.com, Accepted Payments Policy,
http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/accepted-payments-policy.html (last visited June 10, 2009).
218. The majority of the other acceptable payment options, including cash2India.com, are
for international users or are not acceptable for individual use. Additionally, hyperWALLET.com
appears to be designed for organizations or groups so that they can issue their members
individualized spending accounts, rather than for individualized subscriptions and memberships
for use by sellers. See hyperWALLET.com, Login, https://www.hyperwallet.com/login.jsp (last
visited June. 10, 2009) (noting that members cannot transfer funds from an American financial
institution to hyperWALLET.com).
219. See generally ProPay.com, ProPay: Accept Credit Cards-Simple, Safe & Affordable,
https://epay.propay.com (last visited Aug. 26, 2009).
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sellers-Propay.com-to accept online payments. 220 In order to satisfy
eBay's condition that "all sellers must accept Payment Cards as a payment
option, sellers who also want to accept stored-value payments must either
use two or more non-PayPal payment services (incurring increased costs)
or be forced to use PayPal." 221 Further, requiring sellers to accept PayPal
as a payment method, and similarly not allowing for the removal of the
PayPal logo in eBay's online auctions, limits the ability of sellers to accept
alternative payment methods because offering multiple P2P payment
services can confuse novice buyers.
2. EBay Prohibits Sellers from Accepting Checks, Money Orders, and
Other Previously Accepted Payment Methods
Since October 22, 2008,222 eBay, with a few exceptions, no longer
allows sellers to solicit money orders, checks, cash, and payments through
bank-to-bank transfers from buyers. 223 EBay attempted to justify these
restrictions by noting that "over 90% of transactions are paid with online
payment methods and [paper payments] have declined by 40% over the last
,, 2243 years. Despite these alleged statistics, there are still a significant
number of eBay sellers who wish to accept-and buyers who wish to
make-payments by cash, checks, and money transfers; for them, credit
card payments are not adequate substitutes. 225 This policy injures both
buyers and sellers because certain sellers receive a much larger portion of
their payments in the form of money orders and certain buyers continue to
pay for auctions exclusively with money order payments because they do
not trust inputting their credit card information online or providing other
personal information to PayPal. 226
In addition to forcing buyers and sellers to use PayPal to pay for
220. See Accepted Payments Policy, supra note 217.
221. See eBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 11.
222. See eBay.com, August 2008 Update,
http://pages.ebay.com/sell/august2008update/otherfaq/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
223. See Accepted Payments Policy, supra note 217 (noting that sellers may offer bank-to-
bank or wire transfers, checks, or money orders for larger items such as boats, motor cycles and
real estate, as well as items listed in the adult category).
224. Ebay.com, Accepted Payments Policy Changes,
http://pages.ebay.com/sell/August2008Update/Payments (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
225. See generally Ina Steiner, eBay to Tell Shoppers, No Checks or Money Orders,
AUCTIONBYTES.COM, Aug. 28, 2008, http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y08/mO8/i28/sO
(noting "Sellers are saying eBay's ban on checks and money orders is, in effect, a move to a
PayPal-only policy-at least for the many sellers who don't have their own credit card merchant
account").
226. See August 2008 Update, supra note 222.
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online auctions, restricting these formerly acceptable payment methods
hinders consumer privacy by creating a permanent online trail of all their
purchased items. 227 EBay argues that these policy changes are intended to
prevent fraud and increase both seller and buyer security online. 228
However, despite recent policy changes to increase buyer protection,229
potential fraudulent chargebacks from credit cards are plentiful on eBay. 230
An alternative reason for these policies could be to increase corporate
profits that would not be captured if sellers were to accept alternative
methods of payment to eBay auctions outside of PayPal.
3. EBay's Buyer Protection Program is Limited to Buyers Using PayPal
Although historically offering protection for all buyers who purchased
items on eBay, eBay has acted to eliminate protections to non-PayPal
buyers. 231 From 1999 until 2007, eBay offered a buyer protection program
that provided buyers with "coverage of up to $200, less $25 to cover
processing costs, [for] cases of non-shipment or significant
misrepresentation of goods."232 On January 17, 2007, eBay doubled the
PayPal buyer protection, offering $2000-up from $1,000-for
transactions with qualified sellers as long as the buyer paid with PayPal.233
EBay simultaneously eliminated buyer protection for all non-PayPal
transactions. 234 This policy was instituted as eBay began to face increasing
227. See Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn Jr. & Daniel C. Howe, Trust Online, COMMC'NS.
OF THE ACM, Dec. 2000, at 34, 38, available at
http://faculty.washington.edu/pkahn/articles/TrustOnline.pdf.
228. See Accepted Payment Policy Changes, supra note 224 (noting that eBay wants to help
ensure that the marketplace offers buyers safer online payment choices).
229. See EBay Strengthens PayPal's Anti-Fraud Provisions, USATODAY.CoM, June 19,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/2008-06-19-ebay-paypal N.htm
(noting that eBay buyers may be eligible for a full refund if a seller fails to deliver a product and
sellers may be eligible for unlimited protection against a payment card charge being reversed-
these limits on claims were $2000 and $5000 respectively and applied exclusively to buyers in
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom).
230. See Mary M. Calkins, Alexei Nikitkov & Vernon Richardson, Mineshafts on Treasure
Island: A Relief Map of the eBay Fraud Landscape, 8 PGH J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 14-15 (2007)
(noting the popularity and efficiency of credit cards contribute to their wide use and potential for
fraud).
231. See eBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 12.
232. See id.
233. See Ina Steiner, eBay Limits Buyer Protection to PayPal-Funded Transactions,
AUCTIONBYTES.COM, Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y07/mOl/il0/sOl
(noting that eBay will double PayPal Buyer Protection on its site, but is eliminating buyer
protection for non-PayPal transactions).
234. See id.
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competition from Google Checkout. 235
4. EBay Independently Bans Rivals from the Online Auction Payments
Market
a. EBay Bans Google Checkout
On June 29, 2006, Google launched its online payment system,
Google Checkout. 236  Although Google Checkout does not allow for
stored-value payments, it enables purchases using credit cards and allows
merchants to use the checkout system on their websites. 237 Google charges
a 2% and $0.20 processing fee per transaction; "PayPal charges a standard
rate of 2.9% plus $0.30 per transaction, or merchant rates ranging from
1.9%-2.5% plus $0.30 per transaction., 238  Acknowledging this
competitive threat to eBay's online auction revenue, Jeff Jordan, president
of eBay's PayPal unit, immediately asked employees to research Google
Checkout. 239 Further, Jordan noted that Google is "a very legitimate
competitive threat" and "it's hard not to pay attention to what Google is
doing., 240  In early July 2006, eBay announced it was "banning sellers
from requesting payment from Google Checkout." 241 Furthermore, eBay
updated its "Safe Payments Policy"-now titled Accepted Payment
Policies-to reflect this change by adding Google Checkout to its list of
prohibited online payment services. 242
b. EBay Bans Other Competitors
In addition to banning Google Checkout, eBay has banned sellers
243
from using a host of other competitors. EBay has acknowledged that it
limits the type of online payment services buyers can use for online auction
235. See id. (noting that PayPal's buyer protection increase is a dramatic effort by eBay to
push buyers to use its PayPal payment service at a time when it faces increasing competition from
Google Checkout).
236. See Ina Steiner, eBay's Fears Confirmed: Google Launches Checkout Service,
AUCTIONBYTES.COM, June 29, 2006, http://auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y06/m06/i29/s00.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Mylene Mangalindan, PayPal Prepares for a Challenge From Google, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 6, 2006, at B 1.
240. Id. (internal citations omitted).
241. Ina Steiner, EBay Bans Sellers From Using Google Checkout, AUCTIONBYTES.COM,
July 6, 2006, http://auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y06/mO7/iO6/s02.
242. Id.
243. See Accepted Payments Policy, supra note 217 (listing prohibited payment methods).
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payments. 2" Over thirty competitors worldwide are excluded, including
ePassporte.com (ePassporte), Goldmoney.com, Netpay.com, PayPay.com,
and Sendmoneyorder.com. 245 Without eBay's restriction, these
competitors could challenge PayPal for a margin of the profits obtained
from online auction payments. 246 EBay's ban on the ePassporte electronic
payment service is noteworthy since ePassporte allows its customers to
fund their accounts using credit cards, debit cards, or a bank checking
247easpredrclaccount. Therefore, ePassporte would directly compete with PayPal
were it not excluded by eBay. 248 According to eBay's website, these
online payment sites are excluded due to safety concerns. 249 However,
eBay's prior conduct in Australia revealed its true intent to exclude
competition from the online market for P2P systems. 250
5. EBay Has Attempted to Impose PayPal Exclusivity Arrangements
Abroad
EBay's attempt to implement an exclusive PayPal payment policy in
Australia further exemplifies eBay's intent to increase revenue rather than
exclude certain competitors because of any legitimate safety concerns those
competitors might create. 25
E. EBay Thwarts Market Competition by Engaging in Exclusionary
Arrangements with Competitors and Potential Rivals
"Exclusive contracts are commonplace... in our competitive, market
economy." 25 2 Therefore, courts are reluctant to find an antitrust violation
when firms with market power engage in these types of contracts. 253
However, "a monopolist's use of exclusive contracts.. . may give rise to a
§ 2 violation even though the contracts foreclose less than the roughly 40%
244. See id.
245. See id. (noting payment can only be made through eBay-accepted online payment
services, such as Allpay.net).
246. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 14.
247. Id. at 15. See ePassporte.com, Personal Accounts,
https://www.epassporte.com/secure/j sp/PersonalAccounts.jsp.
248. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 15.
249. See generally Accepted Payments Policy, supra note 217.
250. See generally Foo, supra note 18.
251. See generally id.
252. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
253. Id. ("[I]mposing upon a firm with market power the risk of an antitrust suit every time
it enters into such a contract, no matter how small the effect, would create an unacceptable and
unjustified burden upon any such firm.").
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or 50% share usually required in order to establish a § 1 violation." 254 An
exclusive contract or arrangement may have an anticompetitive effect if it
has a substantial effect on preventing competition from entering the
relevant market. 255
For example, Microsoft had exclusive arrangements with lAPs
whereby subscribers of those lAPs were offered IE either as the default
browser or as the only browser.256 Additionally, the court found Microsoft
had entered into exclusive arrangements with important ISVs that agreed to
certain conditions in exchange for preferential support in Windows and the
"right to use certain Microsoft seals of approval., 257  "One of these
conditions [was] that the ISVs use Internet Explorer as the default browsing
software for any software they develop with a hypertext-based user
interface."258 The District Court found that "Microsoft's deals with the
lAPs [and ISVs] clearly ha[d] a significant effect in preserving its
monopoly; they help[ed] keep usage of Navigator below the critical level
necessary for Navigator or any other rival to pose a real threat to
Microsoft's monopoly." 259  Like Microsoft's exclusivity agreement with
lAPs and ISVs, eBay has entered into various exclusivity arrangements
with competitors which were intended to have, and have resulted in, a
substantial effect on restraining competition in the online auction
market. 260 These agreements include marketing and advertising with
America Online, Inc. (AOL) and Yahoo! Inc. (Yahoo). 261
1. EBay Enters into Advertising Arrangement with America Online to
254. Id.
255. Id. (noting that certain circumstances may give rise to a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2).
256. Id. at 71-72 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
257. Id. at 71.
258. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 71-72.
259. Id. at71.
260. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 103-05; see also Stephen Foley, Yahoo! and ebay Join
Forces to Fight Google, INDEPENDENT, May 26, 2006,
http:www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/yahoo-and-ebay-join-forces-to-fight-google-
479806.html; Marshall Kirkpatrick, Google Scores eBay International Advertising Deal,
TECHCRUNCH.COM, Aug. 28, 2006, http://www.techcrunch.com/2006/08/28/google-scores-ebay-
international-advertising-deal!; Yahoo to Close North American Auction Site, May 9, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18578841/; Ina Steiner, eBay's PayPal Battles Google Checkout
with Help of Yahoo, AUCTIONBYTES.COM, Apr. 18, 2007,
http:www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y07/m04/ill8/s0l; Troy Wolverton, Yahoo Shutters
European Auction Sites, CNET NEWS, June 28, 2002, http://news.cnet.com/Yahoo-shutters-
European-auction-sites/2100-1017_3-940580.html.
261. See COHEN, supra note 15, at 103-05; see also Foley, supra note 260; Kirkpatrick,
supra note 260; Yahoo to Close North American Auction Site, supra note 260; Steiner, supra note
260; Wolverton, supra note 260.
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Prevent AOL from Creating a Rival Online Auction Site
In December 1997, eBay finalized negotiations with AOL wherein
eBay paid AOL $750,000 in exchange for AOL's agreement to promote
eBay's user base for six months. 262 EBay mainly entered into the deal
because it believed AOL might enter the online auction business.263 Senior
Director Robert C. Kagle stated that he "thought in some ways [they] were
paying that amount of money to keep AOL from entering the business." 2 6
EBay believed AOL was a threat because of "AOL's skill at e-commerce,
and because of the large overlap between the two companies' registered
users." 265 Further, over the next four years, eBay paid AOL $12 million
for prominent ad placements on the AOL site. 266 This may have resulted in
permanently removing AOL as a potential competitor since it never entered
the online auction market despite having a user base in 1999 of 16 million
members, trumping eBay's 2.1 million users at that time. 
267
2. EBay Engages in Territorial Division Agreements with Rival Yahoo!
EBay has also commenced upon various territorial division
agreements with Yahoo. 268 On May 22, 2002, eBay and auction rival
Yahoo announced a multiyear arrangement, whereby Yahoo agreed to
"stop accepting new listings for its auction sites that serve France,
Germany, Italy, and Spain" and to "close its auction site that serves the
United Kingdom and Ireland." 269 As part of the deal, Yahoo agreed to
promote eBay's rival sites for those European countries via banner
262. COHEN, supra note 15, at 103.
263. See id. at 105 (noting that eBay favored an AOL marketing agreement because it would
likely prevent AOL from getting into online auctions itself).
264. Id. (quoting Senior Director Robert C. Kagle).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 142.
267. See id. (noting that eBay paid AOL $12 million dollars over four years for prominent
placement on the AOL site); Press Release, TimeWarner, America Online and eBay Announce
Strategic Marketing Alliance (Mar. 25, 1999)
http://www.timewarner.concorp/newsroom/pr/0,20812,666500,00.html ( explaining that through
the agreement "AOL will promote eBay to its member community of over 16 million members"
and also "make[] AOL's many brands even more accessible to eBay's more than 2.1 million
registered users").
268. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 20. See also Wolverton, supra note 260 (noting
eBay's agreement with Yahoo).
269. Troy Wolverton, Yahoo Concedes Europe Auctions to eBay, CNET NEWS, May 22,
2002, http://news.cnet.com[Yahoo-concedes-Europe-auctions-to-eBay/2100-1017_3-
921043.html.
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advertisements and text links., 70  In turn, eBay agreed to advertise on
Yahoo's sites in each of those countries. 271 Further, in May 2006, eBay
and Yahoo announced another arrangement whereby Yahoo would be "the
exclusive provider of advertising on eBay's auction site," while eBay's
PayPal service would become the exclusive third-party Yahoo! Wallet
payment method. 272 In April 2007, eBay and Yahoo launched Yahoo!
PayPal Checkout. 273 Shortly thereafter, between June 16 and October 29,
2007, Yahoo closed its U.S. and Canadian auction sites. 274 Ultimately,
these agreements enabled eBay to eliminate Yahoo from competing in the
online auction market. 275
VI. EBAY'S ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT CAUSED ANTITRUST INJURY To
BUYERS AND SELLERS
EBay's practices as outlined above have the potential to injure both
consumers and sellers. To sustain an antitrust injury under the Sherman
Act, the plaintiff must show unlawful conduct, causing an injury to the
plaintiff that flows from that which makes the conduct unlawful and that is
of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. 276 Causation may
be inferred "when exclusionary conduct is aimed at producers of nascent
competitive technologies as well as when it is aimed at producers of
established substitutes." 27 7 By enabling eBay to extract supra-competitive
fees from sellers via its control of PayPal, eBay's anticompetitive conduct
in excluding competitors in the online P2P systems market has resulted in
antitrust injury to consumers. 278 These fees are ultimately borne by
consumers because sellers often indirectly pass such costs on to their
customers to remain in business. Furthermore, eBay's paperless payment
policy, which forces users to use online payments and input their personal
information, has injured consumers by reducing their level of privacy
270. Wolverton, supra note 260.
271. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 21. See Wolverton, supra note 260 ("[Clustomers
who click on 'auctions' on Yahoo's U.K. site come to a page with an eBay logo and a note
describing eBay as Yahoo's 'preferred online auction service."').
272. Foley, supra note 260.
273. Steiner, supra note 260 (noting that PayPal Checkout is a service similar to Google
Checkout, on Yahoo).
274. Yahoo to Close North American Auction Site, supra note 260 (noting Yahoo's closure
of its North American and Canadian sites).
275. EBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 21.
276. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1477 (9th Cir. 1997).
277. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
278. See eBay Complaint, supra note 21, at 10.
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online. 279 Finally, eBay's restraint on competition in the online auction
and P2P payment systems market caused the same types of injuries that the
Sherman Act was designed to prevent in a modem context.280
VII. FAIR ALTERNATIVES OR REMEDIES To EBAY AND PAYPAL'S TRADE
RESTRAINING POLICIES
While there is convincing evidence that proves eBay's monopoly
power restrained competition, there has been conflicting authority on how
to remedy such trade restraint and whether the government should
intervene. 281 Modem American antitrust policy generally recognizes that
monopolies are the reward for successful investment and innovation.2 82 In
fact, the Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he mere possession of monopoly
power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not
unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.
' 283
Alternatively, "European Community (EC)-based competition policy views
competition as the more desirable outcome, and when that is not possible, it
imposes significant obligations on the dominant firm." 284 Although the
regulation of antitrust law of web-based powers (i.e., Google or eBay)
remains fairly new, European approaches to antitrust law may provide
some informative insight for a successful domestic remedy in the case of
eBay. In light of the alternative approaches and possibilities to remedy
eBay's unlawful conduct in trade restraint, two complementary remedies
are recommended: (1) injunctive relief requiring eBay to allow sellers to
solicit money orders, checks, and wire transfers; and (2) injunctive relief
requiring eBay to allow sellers to accept other methods of P2P online
payment systems that are currently prohibited. 285
279. See generally How PayPal Works, supra note 215 (noting that buyers must provide
their bank account or credit card information to make payments unless they have existing funds in
their PayPal account).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34.
281. See, e.g., Verizon Comnmc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004); Evans, supra note 1, at 2003.
282. See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 407 (noting that the induction of risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth is what attracts "business acumen" to the
opportunity to charge monopoly prices in the first place).
283. Id.
284. Evans, supra note 1, at 2003.
285. See discussion supra Part V.D.
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A. Taking Their Case Abroad: Foreign Regulators and the Case of
A.M.D. v. Intel
Antitrust challenges are especially likely under EC law and other
foreign countries where decisional practice imposes "special obligations
and significant scrutiny on firms that have market shares as low as [forty]
percent." 2 86 It should come as no surprise that Intel-a company whose
"pricing is intended to maintain near monopoly on the microprocessor
market"--faced heightened scrutiny abroad. 287 Advanced Micro Devices
(AMD), a smaller rival of Intel, has accused Intel of engaging in
anticompetitive practices to preserve its near monopoly. 288 Specifically,
"AMD has accused Intel of systematically giving its customers-the
world's leading personal computer makers-large discounts, at times
below Intel's own manufacturing costs, in exchange for commitments not
to do business with competitors."289 Intel "responded that its discounts
were legitimate incentives, not offered below cost, and benefit[ted]
customers who c[ould] [then] buy computers at lower prices."2 90 Despite
years of lackluster success in proposing a viable antitrust suit 291 against
Intel in the U.S., AMD initially made far greater strides with European and
Asian regulators.292
In the U.S., state and federal officials have been less vigorous toward
investigating and prosecuting potential antitrust violations than regulators
in foreign countries. 293 However, due to AMD's success overseas, the
FTC opened a formal investigation of Intel for antitrust violations, and
AMD consequently sued Intel in Federal District Court in Delaware. 294
286. See Evans, supra note 1, at 1988.
287. Stephen Labaton, In Turnabout, Antitrust Unit Looks at Intel, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
2008, at Al.
288. See id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. AMD has engaged in two decades of antitrust battles with Intel over chips that power
PCs, but filed its most recent antitrust lawsuit against AMD in the U.S. in Delaware in 2005
which was scheduled for trial in March 2010. Don Clark & Jerry A. Dicalo, Intel to Pay AMD
$1.25 Billion in Settlement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2009, at Al.
292. See Labaton, supra note 287 (noting that the Korean Fair Trade Commission ordered
Intel to pay $25 million for violating its fair trade laws). However, "[i]n the United States... the
quest [to prosecute Intel for maintaining anticompetitive pricing practices] ha[s] not gained much
ground among state authorities or federal regulators." Id. See James Kanter, Europe Fines Intel
$1.45 Billion in Antitrust Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at B8 (noting that the European
Union, fined Intel a record $1.45 Billion dollars for "abusing its dominance in the computer chip
market").
293. Labaton, supra note 287.
294. Id.
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Additionally, on November 4, 2009, New York's attorney general Andrew
M. Cuomo filed an antitrust suit against Intel in Delaware that follows the
lead of similar actions against Intel by European and Asian regulators. 295
On November 12, 2009, Intel announced that it would pay $1.25 billion to
settle its disputes with AMD in exchange for AMD's agreement to drop its
pending lawsuit in Delaware, among other provisions. 296
Following its year-long investigation, on December 16, 2009, the
FTC filed an antitrust lawsuit against Intel "seeking an order that would
prevent Intel from engaging in a variety of actions the FTC believes are
297eanticompetitive," rather than seeking any monetary sanctions. In a case
that has been hailed by commentators as "among the most important since
the antitrust cases brought against Microsoft in the 1990s," the FTC's
decision to sue Intel will certainly have a significant impact on the way
foreign antitrust law influences regulation domestically. 298 As a result,
eBay users' current case against eBay would be subject to heightened
scrutiny abroad. 299 Nevertheless, given AMD's success against Intel
overseas, which arguably was the catalyst for a multi-faceted litigation
campaign by the FTC and attorney general Cuomo, a foreign judgment
against the online auction and P2P system giants may pave the way for
more immediate intervention by U.S. regulators.
B. Finding a Middle Ground: The Case for Injunctive Relief
Under 15 U.S.C. § 26, "[a]ny person, firm, corporation, or association
shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the
United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or
damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." 300 EBay's unlawful conduct
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act damaged and continues to
295. Ashlee Vance, State Accuses Intel in an Antitrust Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at
B1.
296. See James Kanter, A.M.D.-Intel Settlement Won't End Their Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
13, 2009, at BI ("The jury trial in A.M.D's antitrust case against Intel was scheduled to begin in
Delaware next spring. If things had gone against Intel, the chip maker could have been hit with
triple damages.").
297. Brent Kendall & Jerry A. DiCola, 4th UPDATE: US FTC Sues Intel Alleging
Anticompetitive Conduct, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16th, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-
20091216-710620.html. See Eliot Van Buskir, FTC Sues Intel for Anti-Competitive Practices,
WIRED, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/12/ftc-sues-intel-for-anti-competitive-practices
("Intel has engaged in a deliberate campaign to hamstring competitive threats to its monopoly"
(quoting FTC Bureau of Competition director Richard A. Feinstein)).
298. Labaton, supra note 287.
299. See generally eBay Complaint, supra note 21.
300. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2006).
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threaten damage to both consumers and sellers in the online auction and
P2P system markets. 301 Consequently, injunctive relief imposed by the
District Court in the pending eBay antitrust case or via the FTC is
recommended to curb eBay's antitrust violations and increase competition.
This relief should require eBay to allow sellers to (1) solicit money orders,
checks, and wire transfers; and (2) accept other methods of P2P payment
systems. However, the assessment of its costs must be weighed against the
direct benefits of antitrust intervention. Under the best circumstances,
applying the requirements of section 2 of the Sherman Act "can be
difficult... [because] the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of
legitimate competition, are myriad." 3 02 Further, mistaken inferences and
the resulting false condemnations "are especially costly, because they chill
the very conduct [such as risk and innovation that] the antitrust laws are
designed to protect." 
3 03
In light of these considerations, injunctive relief marks the most fair
and efficient adjudication of this legal dispute. Although compliance on its
face would simply result in a policy change in eBay's "Acceptable
Payment Methods," such compliance would in fact be significant because it
would put eBay on notice that further abuse of its monopoly power may
result in heightened government scrutiny and intervention. Compliance
would also result in a smaller percentage of fee extractions from sellers
through PayPal who would have the freedom to use other P2P services or
accept other forms of payment. A more invasive approach such as a
corporate split of eBay into two smaller entities is not only impractical, but
unwarranted. 304 Therefore, the costs of imposing these restrictions are
modest reductions to eBay's corporate infrastructure.
The magnitude of evidence establishing eBay's abuse of its monopoly
power raises the question of why eBay and PayPal have not been legally
challenged more recently for violating antitrust laws. "[B]ecause there are
many markets in which eBay competes, determining which one eBay
allegedly attempted to monopolize would be difficult at best."305 In 2001,
301. See discussion supra Part VI.
302. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
303. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1985).
304. See Peter Dizikes, Justice Dept. Drops Microsoft Breakup Request, ABCNEWS, Sept.
6, 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87749&page=l ("Rather than break up the
company into separate operating systems and applications businesses, the Justice Department said
the government will pursue restrictions on Microsoft's business practices to 'obtain prompt,
effective and certain relief' for consumers.").
305. See Oscar S. Cisneros, eBay Accused of Monopolization, WIRED, July 7, 2000,
http://www.wired.com/print/techbiz/media/news/2000/07/37871 ("Proving monopolization is a
pretty steep hill to climb in a market that's changing on a daily basis." (quoting a prior FTC
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auction listing re-aggregator Bidder's Edge dropped their countersuit
against eBay alleging monopolistic practices. 306 In that case, Bidder's
Edge lacked the financial wherewithal to continue litigation; moreover, the
myriad of exclusionary agreements conducted by eBay, including its
307acquisition of PayPal, ceased to exist. Additionally, litigation against a
powerful company like eBay can cost millions. 308 Because such class
action lawsuits require a large investment, law firms working on a
contingency fee basis are not likely to make such an investment unless they
believe they have a clear-cut case that is highly lucrative. Finally, as
dicussed above, current antitrust regulators such as the DOJ have been
hesitant to prosecute or interfere with large corporations possessing
monopoly power, leaving the colossal task up to private litigants. 309
VIII. CONCLUSION
Web-based businesses that have substantial shares in their relevant
markets, such as eBay and Google, will continue to emerge in our global
economy. 310 Although the incentives to monopolize spur significant
innovation and growth, regulators cannot remain dormant if companies use
their monopolistic advantage to engage in anticompetitive conduct. EBay,
as well as many other technology firms, have recently felt the economic
impact from a global recession. 311 Nevertheless, such global economic
attorney Peter Ward).
306. See Troy Wolverton, eBay, Bidder's Edge End Legal Dispute, CNET NEWS, Mar. 1,
2001, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-253443.html (noting that eBay and Bidder's Edge signed
an agreement whereby Bidder's Edge agreed to "drop its appeal of an injunction that barred it
from using an automated search [system] to comb eBay's listings").
307. See id. ("The settlement comes a week after Bidder's Edge shut down its Web site
[sic], citing market conditions.").
308. See generally id.
309. See generally Ina Steiner, Justice Dept. Closes Antitrust Investigation Against eBay,
Company Reports, AUCTIONBYTES.COM, Mar. 26, 2002,
http://www.auctionbytes.com/cab/abn/y02/mO3/i26/s02 ("[T]he Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice ha[d] closed its investigation against [eBay] without taking action."); see
also Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Div. On Its
Decision to Close Its Investigation of M Satellite Radio Holdings Inc. 's Merger With Sirius
Satellite Radio Inc., Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08at226.html
(noting that the Division decided to close its investigation of the merger between XM Satellite
Radio and Sirius Satellite Radio despite the existence of a market where only two major satellite
radio finns existed).
310. See Evans, supra note 1, at 1999.
311. See Jessica Guynn, eBay Swings to Profit But Cuts Forecast, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2008, at C3 (noting a 13.6% drop in eBay stocks).
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downturn should not provide a free pass for powerful companies to violate
antitrust laws.
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